Competitive routing in multiuser communication networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
On the existence of equilibria in noncooperative optimal flow control
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Making greed work in networks: a game-theoretic analysis of switch service disciplines
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Proceedings of the first international conference on Information and computation economies
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing (extended abstract)
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Computational Aspacts of Organization Theory (Extended Abstract)
ESA '96 Proceedings of the Fourth Annual European Symposium on Algorithms
FOCS '00 Proceedings of the 41st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Atomic Resource Sharing in Noncooperative Networks
INFOCOM '97 Proceedings of the INFOCOM '97. Sixteenth Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies. Driving the Information Revolution
Algorithms for selfish agents mechanism design for distributed computation
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Architecting noncooperative networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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We study noncooperative games whose players are selfish, distributed users of a network and the game's objective is to optimize Quality of Service (QoS). Our classes of games are based on generally accepted realistic microeconomic market models of QoS provision, and unlike most other games that have been recently studied in this context, stability is not guaranteed for our class of games. Stability here refers to whether the game reaches a Nash equilibrium. Optimality is a measure of how close a Nash equilibrium is to optimizing a given objective function defined on game configuration. The overall goal is to determine a minimal set of static game rules based on pricing that result in stable and optimal QoS provision. The combination of stability and optimality opens an interesting direction of investigation. We give a new and general technique to establish stability and demonstrate a close trade-off between stability and optimality for our game classes. Additionally, these results directly give a simple, computationally efficient, self-organizing mechamism for stable and optimal QoS provision in natural cases.