Avoiding paradoxes in multi-agent competitive routing

Authors:
Eitan Altman;Rachid El Azouzi;Odile Pourtallier
Affiliations:
Projet MISTRAL, INRIA, B.P. 93, 2004 Route des Lucioles, F-06902 Sophia Antipolis Cedex, France;Projet MISTRAL, INRIA, B.P. 93, 2004 Route des Lucioles, F-06902 Sophia Antipolis Cedex, France;Projet MISTRAL, INRIA, B.P. 93, 2004 Route des Lucioles, F-06902 Sophia Antipolis Cedex, France
Venue:
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Year:
2003

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Abstract

Strange behavior may occur in networks due to the non-cooperative nature of decision making, when the latter are taken by individual agents. In particular, the well known Braess paradox illustrates that when upgrading a network by adding a link, the resulting equilibrium may exhibit larger delays for all users. We present here some guidelines to avoid the Braess paradox when upgrading a network. We furthermore present conditions for the delays to be monotone increasing in the total demand.