The effectiveness of web search engines for retrieving relevant ecommerce links
Information Processing and Management: an International Journal
Defection detection: predicting search engine switching
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
Enhancing web search by promoting multiple search engine use
Proceedings of the 31st annual international ACM SIGIR conference on Research and development in information retrieval
Stream prediction using a generative model based on frequent episodes in event sequences
Proceedings of the 14th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
Characterizing and predicting search engine switching behavior
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Information and knowledge management
Why searchers switch: understanding and predicting engine switching rationales
Proceedings of the 34th international ACM SIGIR conference on Research and development in Information Retrieval
Effects of search success on search engine re-use
Proceedings of the 20th ACM international conference on Information and knowledge management
An analysis of search engine switching behavior using click streams
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Modeling long-term search engine usage
UMAP'10 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on User Modeling, Adaptation, and Personalization
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The Internet search engine market has seen a proliferation of entrants over the last few years. While Yahoo! was the early market leader, there has been entry by both lower quality engines and higher quality ones. Prior work on quality differentiation requires that low quality products have low prices, in order to survive in a market with high quality products. However, the price charged to users of search engines is typically zero. Therefore, consumers do not face a trade-off between quality and price. We develop a vertical differentiation model to show that even lower quality engines can survive in this market. A key property of the model is that, due to low costs users who try out one engine may also sample a lower quality engine in the same session. This "residual demand" allows lower quality products to survive in equilibrium.We consider a two-period dynamic game between an incumbent and an entrant who enters in the second period. The incumbent has the .rst mover advantage due to early entry and brand loyalty, while the entrant may have a cost advantage, based on superior technology. The interaction of these two effects determines which product has higher quality in equilibrium.We also consider the issue of strategic invesments in quality and show that incumbent may under-invest or over-invest in its quality depending on entrant's cost structure.