A social process model of user-analyst relationships
MIS Quarterly
Software project dynamics: an integrated approach
Software project dynamics: an integrated approach
When professional standards are lax: the CONFIRM failure and its lessons
Communications of the ACM
Multivariate data analysis (4th ed.): with readings
Multivariate data analysis (4th ed.): with readings
Computer-Mediated Communication and Majority Influence
Management Science
Blowing the whistle on troubled software projects
Communications of the ACM
Management Information Systems: The Manager's View
Management Information Systems: The Manager's View
Information Technology Project Management
Information Technology Project Management
Journal of Management Information Systems
Moral Hazard, ethical considerations, and the decision to implement an information system
Journal of Management Information Systems
Keeping Mum as the Project Goes Under: Toward an Explanatory Model
Journal of Management Information Systems
A survey of architecture design rationale
Journal of Systems and Software
Software development risk and project performance measurement: Evidence in Korea
Journal of Systems and Software
Databases and the geometry of knowledge
Data & Knowledge Engineering
The iterative design of a project charter for interdisciplinary research
Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Designing interactive systems
Journal of Systems and Software
Mitigating Vendor Silence in Offshore Outsourcing: An Empirical Investigation
Journal of Management Information Systems
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The reluctance to transmit bad news is a problem that is endemic to many organizations. When large projects go awry, it often takes weeks, months, and sometimes even years, before senior management becomes fully aware of what has happened. Accurate communication concerning a project and its status is therefore critical if organizations are to avoid costly and embarrassing debacles. This paper describes the results of an experiment designed to explore some key variables that may influence an individual's willingness to report bad news in an information systems project context. We extend a basic theoretical model derived from the whistle-blowing literature by considering relevant constructs from agency theory. We then test the entire model using a controlled experiment that employs a role-playing scenario. The results explain a significant portion of the variance in the reluctance to report negative status information. Implications for research and practice are discussed, along with directions for future research.