The Implications of an Externalist Theory of Rule-Following Behaviour for Robot Cognition

Authors:
Diane Proudfoot
Affiliations:
Department of Philosophy, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand/ E-mail: diane.proudfoot@canterbury.ac.nz
Venue:
Minds and Machines
Year:
2004

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Abstract

Given (1) Wittgenstein’s externalist analysis of the distinction between following a rule and behaving in accordance with a rule, (2) prima facie connections between rule-following and psychological capacities, and (3) pragmatic issues about training, it follows that most, even all, future ‘artificially intelligent’ computers and robots will not use language, possess concepts, or reason. This argument suggests that AI’s traditional aim of building ‘machines with minds’, exemplified in current work on cognitive robotics, is in need of substantial revision.