Fast algorithms for finding randomized strategies in game trees
STOC '94 Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Representations and solutions for game-theoretic problems
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
Flexible double auctions for electionic commerce: theory and implementation
Decision Support Systems - Special issue on economics of electronic commerce
Decision procedures for multiple auctions
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 2
Designing the Market Game for a Trading Agent Competition
IEEE Internet Computing
Autonomous Bidding Agents in the Trading Agent Competition
IEEE Internet Computing
Sequential Auctions for the Allocation of Resources with Complementarities
IJCAI '99 Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Structural leverage and fictitious play in sequential auctions
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
The 2001 trading agent competition
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
ATTac-2000: an adaptive autonomous bidding agent
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Flexible decision-making in sequential auctions
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
Social interaction and continuance intention in online auctions: A social capital perspective
Decision Support Systems
Managing information diffusion in Name-Your-Own-Price auctions
Decision Support Systems
Methods and algorithms for infinite Bayesian Stackelberg security games
GameSec'10 Proceedings of the First international conference on Decision and game theory for security
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Design of online auctions: Proxy versus non-proxy settings
Decision Support Systems
Repeated auctions with complementarities
AMEC'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms
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We model sequential, possibly multiunit, sealed bid auctions as a sequential game with imperfect and incomplete information. We develop an agent that constructs a bidding policy by sampling the valuation space of its opponents, solving the resulting complete information game, and aggregating the samples into a policy. The constructed policy takes advantage of information learned in the early stages of the game and is flexible with respect to assumptions about the other bidders' valuations. Because the straightforward expansion of the complete information game is intractable, we develop a more concise representation that takes advantage of the sequential auctions' natural structure. We examine the performance of our agent versus agents that play perfectly, agents that also create policies using Monte Carlo, and other benchmarks. The technique performs quite well in these empirical studies, although the tractability of the problem is bounded by the ability to solve component games.