A field study of the software design process for large systems
Communications of the ACM
Software testing techniques (2nd ed.)
Software testing techniques (2nd ed.)
Software failure: management failure: amazing stories and cautionary tales
Software failure: management failure: amazing stories and cautionary tales
Safer C: Developing Software for in High-Integrity and Safety-Critical Systems
Safer C: Developing Software for in High-Integrity and Safety-Critical Systems
Generating Test Data with Enhanced Context-Free Grammars
IEEE Software
How Did Software Get So Reliable Without Proof?
FME '96 Proceedings of the Third International Symposium of Formal Methods Europe on Industrial Benefit and Advances in Formal Methods
Towards Industrially Applicable Formal Methods: Three Small Steps, and One Giant Leap
ICFEM '98 Proceedings of the Second IEEE International Conference on Formal Engineering Methods
Validating the Itanium 2 Exception Control Unit: A Unit-Level Approach
IEEE Design & Test
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In this paper I examine the issue of whether we can trust software systems and put forward an argument that in an absolute sense the answer must necessarily be no for a multitude of reasons. The paper then examines the question of whether this is an actual impediment to the successful application of software with particular reference to automotive applications. In particular I examine the question of whether our expectations of software are compatible with the realities of road vehicle manufacture and use. I conclude that with good methodology and integration within a whole vehicle development process, software based systems can, and will provide levels of safety above those which are experienced today so long as certain critical constraints are met.