Making greed work in networks: a game-theoretic analysis of switch service disciplines
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Achieving network optima using Stackelberg routing strategies
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Pricing congestible network resources
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
A Fuzzy Bilevel Model and a PSO-Based Algorithm for Day-Ahead Electricity Market Strategy Making
KES '09 Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Knowledge-Based and Intelligent Information and Engineering Systems: Part II
A bilevel optimization model and a PSO-based algorithm in day-ahead electricity markets
SMC'09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE international conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics
Computers and Industrial Engineering
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In this paper, we present a bilevel programming formulation of a deregulated electricity market. By examining the electricity market in this format, we achieve two things. First, the relation of the deregulated electricity market to general economic models that can be formulated as bilevel programming problems (e.g. Stackelberg leader-follower games and principal-agency models) becomes clear. Secondly, it provides an explanation of the reason why the so-called "folk theorems" can be proven to be false for electricity networks. The interpretation of the deregulated electricity market as a bilevel program also indicates the magnitude of the error that can be made if the electricity market model studied does not take into account the physical constraints of the electric grid, or oversimplifies the electricity network to a radial network.