Non-cooperative games for service differentiation in CDMA systems

Authors:
Mainak Chatterjee;Haitao Lin;Sajal K. Das
Affiliations:
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL;CMS System Engineering, Nortel, Richardson, TX;Center for Research in Wireless Mobility and Networking, Computer Science & Engineering, University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX
Venue:
Mobile Networks and Applications
Year:
2005

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Abstract

In this paper, we address the problem of user-class based service differentiation in CDMA networks. Users are categorized into three classes who get differentiated services based on their expected quality of service (QoS) from the service provider and the price they are willing to pay. We adopt a game theoretic approach for allocating resources through a two-step process. During a service admission, resource distribution is determined for each class. Then, the resource allocated to each class is distributed among the active users in that class. We devise a utility function for the providers which considers the expected revenue and the probability of users leaving their service provider if they are not satisfied with the service. Our model demonstrates how power can be controlled in a CDMA network to differentiate the service quality. Also, we show the impact of admitting high paying users on other users.