Inoculation strategies for victims of viruses and the sum-of-squares partition problem

  • Authors:
  • James Aspnes;Kevin Chang;Aleksandr Yampolskiy

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science, Yale University, New Haven, CT;Department of Computer Science, Yale University, New Haven, CT;Department of Computer Science, Yale University, New Haven, CT

  • Venue:
  • Journal of Computer and System Sciences
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

We propose a simple game for modeling containment of the spread of viruses in a graph of n nodes. Each node must choose to either install anti-virus software at some known cost C, or risk infection and a loss L if a virus that starts at a random initial point in the graph can reach it without being stopped by some intermediate node. We prove many game theoretic properties of the model, including an easily applied characterization of Nash equilibria, culminating in our showing that a centralized solution can give a much better total cost than an equilibrium solution. Though it is NP-hard to compute such a social optimum, we show that the problem can be reduced to a previously unconsidered combinatorial problem that we call the sum-of-squares partition problem. Using a greedy algorithm based on sparse cuts, we show that this problem can be approximated to within a factor of O(log1.5 n).