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Since their invention in the mid 1980s, Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC) have become an alternative to common Public-Key (PK) cryptosystems such as, e.g., RSA. The utilization of Elliptic Curves (EC) in cryptography is very promising because of their resistance against powerful index-calculus attacks. Providing a similar level of security as RSA, ECC allows for efficient implementation due to a significantly smaller bit size of the operands. It is widely accepted that the only feasible way to attack actual cryptosystems, if at all, is the application of dedicated hardware. In times of continuous technological improvements and increasing computing power, the question of the security of ECC against attacks based on special-purpose hardware and, in particular based on recently emerged low-cost FPGAs, arises.This work presents the first architecture with a corresponding FPGA implementation of an attack against ECC over prime fields. We describe an FPGA-based multi-processing hardware architecture for the Pollard-Rho method which is, to our knowledge, currently the most efficient attack against ECC. The implementation is running on a contemporary low-cost FPGA which allows for a much better cost-performance ratio than conventional CPUs. With the implementation at hand, a fairly accurate estimate about the cost of an FPGA-based attack can be given. We will extrapolate the results on actual ECC key lengths (128 bits and above) and estimate the expected runtimes for a successful attack. Since FPGA-based attacks are out of reach for key lengths exceeding 128 bits, we provide estimates for an ASIC design.Based on our results, currently used elliptic curve cryptosystems (160 bit and above) are infeasible to break with available computational and financial resources. However, some of the security standards proposed by the SECG in [2, 3] become subject to attacks based on low-cost FPGAs.