Public access to the Internet
Internet economics
The economics of network management
Communications of the ACM
Streamlining the Digital Economy: How to Avert a Tragedy of the Commons
IEEE Internet Computing
Digital music and online sharing: software piracy 2.0?
Communications of the ACM - A game experience in every application
HICSS '05 Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 38th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - Volume 07
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Comparison of Software Quality Under Perpetual Licensing and Software as a Service
Journal of Management Information Systems
Price Mechanism for Knowledge Transfer: An Integrative Theory
Journal of Management Information Systems
Optimal Pricing of Digital Experience Goods Under Piracy
Journal of Management Information Systems
Selling or Advertising: Strategies for Providing Digital Media Online
Journal of Management Information Systems
Information Systems Research
Pricing digital content distribution over heterogeneous channels
Decision Support Systems
Pricing strategies for tied digital contents and devices
Decision Support Systems
Entertainment Without Borders: The Impact of Digital Technologies on Government Cultural Policy
Journal of Management Information Systems
Business modeling for online video services: download vs. streaming
Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Electronic Commerce
Entertainment Without Borders: The Impact of Digital Technologies on Government Cultural Policy
Journal of Management Information Systems
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This paper uses modified economic growth theory to compare and contrast two currently available ways of digital content distribution: the client-server model and the peer-to-peer (P2P) model. We describe a monopolistic pricing scheme for distributing digital content over P2P networks that rewards peer users who actively participate in the distribution process. Our results show that digital distribution through a P2P network is more profitable and more efficient than in the corresponding client-server setting, if the pricing mechanism used provides strong incentives to users to share content. The basic results hold when the model is extended to include time-variant preferences across generations of consumers, and when the monopolist performs price discrimination based on generations. Some practical implications from the theoretical analysis are also discussed.