Protection strategies for direct access to virtualized I/O devices

  • Authors:

  • Paul Willmann;Scott Rixner;Alan L. Cox

  • Affiliations:

  • Rice University;Rice University;Rice University

  • Venue:
  • ATC'08 USENIX 2008 Annual Technical Conference on Annual Technical Conference
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

Commodity virtual machine monitors forbid direct access to I/O devices by untrusted guest operating systems in order to provide protection and sharing. However, both I/O memory management units (IOMMUs) and recently proposed software-based methods can be used to reduce the overhead of I/O virtualization by providing untrusted guest operating systems with safe, direct access to I/O devices. This paper explores the performance and safety tradeoffs of strategies for using these mechanisms. The protection strategies presented in this paper provide equivalent inter-guest protection among operating system instances. However, they provide varying levels of intra-guest protection from driver software and incur varying levels of overhead. A simple direct-map strategy incurs the least overhead, providing native-level performance but offering no enhanced protection from misbehaving device drivers within the guest operating system. Additional protection against guest drivers can be achieved by limiting IOMMU page-table mappings to memory buffers that are actually used in I/O transfers. Furthermore, the cost incurred by this limitation can be minimized by aggressively reusing these mappings. Surprisingly, a software-only strategy that does not use an IOMMU at all performs competitively, and sometimes better than, hardware-based strategies while maintaining strict inter-guest isolation.