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Amazon.com Recommendations: Item-to-Item Collaborative Filtering
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Maximizing the spread of influence through a social network
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The dynamics of viral marketing
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Maximizing influence in a competitive social network: a follower's perspective
Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Electronic commerce
Competitive influence maximization in social networks
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Patterns of influence in a recommendation network
PAKDD'06 Proceedings of the 10th Pacific-Asia conference on Advances in Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining
Influential nodes in a diffusion model for social networks
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
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Threshold models for competitive influence in social networks
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Limiting the spread of misinformation in social networks
Proceedings of the 20th international conference on World wide web
Where the blogs tip: connectors, mavens, salesmen and translators of the blogosphere
Proceedings of the First Workshop on Social Media Analytics
Data-driven modeling and analysis of online social networks
WAIM'11 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Web-age information management
Diffusion in social networks with competing products
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Maximizing influence in competitive environments: a game-theoretic approach
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Winner takes all: competing viruses or ideas on fair-play networks
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Interacting viruses in networks: can both survive?
Proceedings of the 18th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
Application of the ant colony optimization algorithm to competitive viral marketing
SETN'12 Proceedings of the 7th Hellenic conference on Artificial Intelligence: theories and applications
Competing memes propagation on networks: a case study of composite networks
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Containment of misinformation spread in online social networks
Proceedings of the 3rd Annual ACM Web Science Conference
A game-theoretic analysis of a competitive diffusion process over social networks
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The bang for the buck: fair competitive viral marketing from the host perspective
Proceedings of the 19th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
Strategyproof mechanisms for competitive influence in networks
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web
Analysis of misinformation containment in online social networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Model of opinion interactions base on evolutionary game in social network
ICIC'13 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Intelligent Computing Theories and Technology
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In this paper we examine the diffusion of competing rumors in social networks. Two players select a disjoint subset of nodes as initiators of the rumor propagation, seeking to maximize the number of persuaded nodes. We use concepts of game theory and location theory and model the selection of starting nodes for the rumors as a strategic game. We show that computing the optimal strategy for both the first and the second player is NP-complete, even in a most restricted model. Moreover we prove that determining an approximate solution for the first player is NP-complete as well. We analyze several heuristics and show that--counter-intuitively--being the first to decide is not always an advantage, namely there exist networks where the second player can convince more nodes than the first, regardless of the first player's decision.