Mining the network value of customers
Proceedings of the seventh ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
Maximizing the spread of influence through a social network
Proceedings of the ninth ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
The dynamics of viral marketing
ACM Transactions on the Web (TWEB)
On the submodularity of influence in social networks
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The role of compatibility in the diffusion of technologies through social networks
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Maximizing influence in a competitive social network: a follower's perspective
Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Electronic commerce
Word of Mouth: Rumor Dissemination in Social Networks
SIROCCO '08 Proceedings of the 15th international colloquium on Structural Information and Communication Complexity
A note on competitive diffusion through social networks
Information Processing Letters
On the Approximability of Influence in Social Networks
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics
Competitive influence maximization in social networks
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Threshold models for competitive influence in social networks
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Diffusion in social networks with competing products
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
A comment on pure-strategy Nash equilibria in competitive diffusion games
Information Processing Letters
Competitive contagion in networks
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
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We study a game-theoretic model for the diffusion of competing products in social networks. Particularly, we consider a simultaneous non-cooperative game between competing firms that try to target customers in a social network. This triggers a competitive diffusion process, and the goal of each firm is to maximize the eventual number of adoptions of its own product. We study issues of existence, computation and performance (social inefficiency) of pure strategy Nash equilibria in these games. We mainly focus on 2-player games, and we model the diffusion process using the known linear threshold model. Nonetheless, many of our results continue to hold under a more general framework for this process.