IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Sampled traffic analysis by internet-exchange-level adversaries
PET'07 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Privacy enhancing technologies
Scalable Link-Based Relay Selection for Anonymous Routing
PETS '09 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Anonymity and monitoring: how to monitor the infrastructure of an anonymity system
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C: Applications and Reviews
Scalable anonymous communication with provable security
HotSec'10 Proceedings of the 5th USENIX conference on Hot topics in security
ExperimenTor: a testbed for safe and realistic tor experimentation
CSET'11 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Cyber security experimentation and test
PIR-Tor: scalable anonymous communication using private information retrieval
SEC'11 Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Leaving timing-channel fingerprints in hidden service log files
Digital Investigation: The International Journal of Digital Forensics & Incident Response
Methodically modeling the Tor network
CSET'12 Proceedings of the 5th USENIX conference on Cyber Security Experimentation and Test
Changing of the guards: a framework for understanding and improving entry guard selection in tor
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Comparison of low-latency anonymous communication systems: practical usage and performance
AISC '11 Proceedings of the Ninth Australasian Information Security Conference - Volume 116
The design and implementation of the A3 application-aware anonymity platform
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
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In this paper we explore the tradeoffs between security and performance in anonymity networks such as Tor. Using probability of path compromise as a measure of security, we explore the behaviour of various path selection algorithms with a Tor path simulator. We demonstrate that assumptions about the relative expense of IP addresses and cheapness of bandwidth break down if attackers are allowed to purchase access to botnets, giving plentiful IP addresses, but each with relatively poor symmetric bandwidth. We further propose that the expected latency of data sent through a network is a useful performance metric, show how it may be calculated, and demonstrate the counter-intuitive result that Tor's current path selection scheme, designed for performance, both performs well and is good for anonymity in the presence of a botnet-based adversary.