Architectural support for copy and tamper resistant software
ASPLOS IX Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
AEGIS: architecture for tamper-evident and tamper-resistant processing
ICS '03 Proceedings of the 17th annual international conference on Supercomputing
Architecture for Protecting Critical Secrets in Microprocessors
Proceedings of the 32nd annual international symposium on Computer Architecture
Improving Cost, Performance, and Security of Memory Encryption and Authentication
Proceedings of the 33rd annual international symposium on Computer Architecture
Proceedings of the 40th Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture
TEC-Tree: A Low-Cost, Parallelizable Tree for Efficient Defense Against Memory Replay Attacks
CHES '07 Proceedings of the 9th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Parallelizable authentication trees
SAC'05 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Hardware Mechanisms for Memory Authentication: A Survey of Existing Techniques and Engines
Transactions on Computational Science IV
A framework for testing hardware-software security architectures
Proceedings of the 26th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
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Memory authentication is the ability to detect unauthorized modification of memory. Existing solutions for memory authentication are based on tree structures computed over either the Physical Address Space (PAS tree) or the Virtual Address Space (VAS tree). We show that the PAS tree is vulnerable to branch splicingattacks when providing memory authentication to an application running on a potentially compromised operating system. We also explain why the VAS tree generates initialization and memory overheads so large as to make it impractical, especially on 64-bit address spaces. To enable secure and efficient application memory authentication, we present a novel Reduced Address Space(RAS) containing only those pages that are useful to a protected application at any point in time. We introduce the Tree Management Unit(TMU) to manage the RAS tree, a dynamically expanding memory integrity tree computed over the RAS. The TMU is scalable, enabling tree schemes to scale up to cover 64-bit address spaces. It dramatically reduces the overheads of application memory authentication without weakening the security properties or degrading runtime performance. For SPEC 2000 benchmarks, the TMU speeds up tree initialization and reduces memory overheads by three orders of magnitude on average.