Communications of the ACM
Interaction and outeraction: instant messaging in action
CSCW '00 Proceedings of the 2000 ACM conference on Computer supported cooperative work
What is chat doing in the workplace?
CSCW '02 Proceedings of the 2002 ACM conference on Computer supported cooperative work
The character, functions, and styles of instant messaging in the workplace
CSCW '02 Proceedings of the 2002 ACM conference on Computer supported cooperative work
Pricing via Processing or Combatting Junk Mail
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
IBM Systems Journal
Predictors of answer quality in online Q&A sites
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
Pricing electronic mail to solve the problem of spam
Human-Computer Interaction
mimir: a market-based real-time question and answer service
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
Don't ask me: designing social Q&A services
Crossroads - The Social Web
Hidden markets: UI design for a P2P backup application
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
Sellers' problems in human computation markets
Proceedings of the ACM SIGKDD Workshop on Human Computation
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There is a growing interest in applying market mechanisms to tackle everyday communication problems such as communication interruptions and communication overload. Prior analytic proofs have shown that a signaling and screening mechanism can make senders and recipients of messages better off. However, these proofs make certain assumptions that do not hold in real world environments. For example, these prior works assume that there are no transaction costs in a communication market and that monetary incentives are the only motivators in communication between strangers. This research builds upon prior analytic work and empirically tests the validity of the claim that signaling and screening mechanisms will improve communication welfare. Our results show that while these types of markets can indeed improve communication welfare, a simpler, less expressive fixed-price market can lead to higher welfare than a more expressive, variable pricing and screening mechanism. Findings from this study also provide valuable insights for technology designs. For example, these results suggest the need to reduce cognitive overhead in using communication markets.