Limits on the security of coin flips when half the processors are faulty
STOC '86 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multiparty unconditionally secure protocols
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Verifiable secret sharing and multiparty protocols with honest majority
STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
PODC '97 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Simplified VSS and fast-track multiparty computations with applications to threshold cryptography
PODC '98 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Secure Computation without Agreement
DISC '02 Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Distributed Computing
Trading Correctness for Privacy in Unconditional Multi-Party Computation (Extended Abstract)
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
General Adversaries in Unconditional Multi-party Computation
ASIACRYPT '99 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Protocols for secure computations
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Proofs that yield nothing but their validity and a methodology of cryptographic protocol design
SFCS '86 Proceedings of the 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Secure multi-party computation made simple
Discrete Applied Mathematics - Special issue: Coding and cryptography
Efficient multiparty computations secure against an adaptive adversary
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Secure multi-party computation made simple
SCN'02 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Security in communication networks
Efficient Byzantine agreement with faulty minority
ASIACRYPT'07 Proceedings of the Advances in Crypotology 13th international conference on Theory and application of cryptology and information security
MPC vs. SFE: perfect security in a unified corruption model
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
On combining privacy with guaranteed output delivery in secure multiparty computation
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
International Journal of Applied Cryptography
Graceful degradation in multi-party computation
ICITS'11 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information theoretic security
Player-centric Byzantine agreement
ICALP'11 Proceedings of the 38th international colloquim conference on Automata, languages and programming - Volume Part I
Passive corruption in statistical multi-party computation
ICITS'12 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Theoretic Security
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In secure computation among a set $\mathcal{P}$ of players one considers an adversary who can corrupt certain players. The three usually considered types of corruption are active, passive, and fail corruption. The adversary's corruption power is characterized by a so-called adversary structure which enumerates the adversary's corruption options, each option being a triple (A ,E ,F ) of subsets of $\mathcal{P}$, where the adversary can actively corrupt the players in A , passively corrupt the players in E , and fail-corrupt the players in F . This paper is concerned with characterizing for which adversary structures general secure function evaluation (SFE) and secure (reactive) multi-party computation (MPC) is possible, in various models. This has been achieved so far only for the very special model of perfect security, where, interestingly, the conditions for SFE and MPC are distinct. Such a separation was first observed by Ishai et al. in the context of computational security. We give the exact conditions for general SFE and MPC to be possible for information-theoretic security (with negligible error probability) and for computational security, assuming a broadcast channel, with and without setup. In all these settings we confirm the strict separation between SFE and MPC. As a simple consequence of our results we solve an open problem for computationally secure MPC in a threshold model with all three corruption types.