STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multiparty unconditionally secure protocols
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Verifiable secret sharing and multiparty protocols with honest majority
STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Perfectly secure message transmission
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
PODC '97 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Communications of the ACM
Unconditional Byzantine Agreement for any Number of Faulty Processors
STACS '92 Proceedings of the 9th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Multiparty Protocols Tolerating Half Faulty Processors
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Efficient Multiparty Protocols Using Circuit Randomization
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Trading Correctness for Privacy in Unconditional Multi-Party Computation (Extended Abstract)
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
General Adversaries in Unconditional Multi-party Computation
ASIACRYPT '99 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
On achieving the "best of both worlds" in secure multiparty computation
Proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Protocols for secure computations
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
MPC vs. SFE: Unconditional and Computational Security
ASIACRYPT '08 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Efficient multiparty computations secure against an adaptive adversary
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Two-threshold broadcast and detectable multi-party computation
EUROCRYPT'03 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques
Secure multi-party computation made simple
SCN'02 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Security in communication networks
MPC vs. SFE: perfect security in a unified corruption model
TCC'08 Proceedings of the 5th conference on Theory of cryptography
Hybrid-secure MPC: trading information-theoretic robustness for computational privacy
Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGACT-SIGOPS symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Graceful degradation in multi-party computation
ICITS'11 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information theoretic security
On combining privacy with guaranteed output delivery in secure multiparty computation
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Efficient multi-party computation with dispute control
TCC'06 Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryptography
Federated flow-based approach for privacy preserving connectivity tracking
Proceedings of the ninth ACM conference on Emerging networking experiments and technologies
Hi-index | 0.00 |
The goal of Multi-Party Computation (MPC) is to perform an arbitrary computation in a distributed, private, and fault-tolerant way. For this purpose, a fixed set of n parties runs a protocol that tolerates an adversary corrupting a subset of the parties, preserving certain security guarantees like correctness, secrecy, robustness, and fairness. Corruptions can be either passive or active: A passively corrupted party follows the protocol correctly, but the adversary learns the entire internal state of this party. An actively corrupted party is completely controlled by the adversary, and may deviate arbitrarily from the protocol. A mixed adversary may at the same time corrupt some parties actively and some additional parties passively. In this work, we consider the statistical setting with mixed adversaries and study the exact consequences of active and passive corruptions on secrecy, correctness, robustness, and fairness separately (i.e., hybrid security). Clearly, the number of passive corruptions affects the thresholds for secrecy, while the number of active corruptions affects all thresholds. It turns out that in the statistical setting, the number of passive corruptions in particular also affects the threshold for correctness, i.e., in all protocols there are (tolerated) adversaries for which a single additional passive corruption is sufficient to break correctness. This is in contrast to both the perfect and the computational setting, where such an influence cannot be observed. Apparently, this effect arises from the use of information-theoretic signatures, which are part of most (if not all) statistical protocols.