STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Completeness theorems for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multiparty unconditionally secure protocols
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Verifiable secret sharing and multiparty protocols with honest majority
STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
PODC '97 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
The Byzantine Generals Problem
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Consensus With Dual Failure Modes
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
A Continuum of Failure Models for Distributed Computing
WDAG '92 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Distributed Algorithms
Efficient Byzantine Agreement Secure Against General Adversaries
DISC '98 Proceedings of the 12th International Symposium on Distributed Computing
Foundations of Secure Interactive Computing
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Trading Correctness for Privacy in Unconditional Multi-Party Computation (Extended Abstract)
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
General Adversaries in Unconditional Multi-party Computation
ASIACRYPT '99 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Polynomial algorithms for multiple processor agreement
STOC '82 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A Model for Asynchronous Reactive Systems and its Application to Secure Message Transmission
SP '01 Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Protocols for secure computations
SFCS '82 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Secure multi-party computation made simple
SCN'02 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Security in communication networks
On combining privacy with guaranteed output delivery in secure multiparty computation
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
MPC vs. SFE: Unconditional and Computational Security
ASIACRYPT '08 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
International Journal of Applied Cryptography
A zero-one law for secure multi-party computation with ternary outputs
TCC'11 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theory of cryptography
Graceful degradation in multi-party computation
ICITS'11 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information theoretic security
Player-centric Byzantine agreement
ICALP'11 Proceedings of the 38th international colloquim conference on Automata, languages and programming - Volume Part I
Passive corruption in statistical multi-party computation
ICITS'12 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information Theoretic Security
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Secure function evaluation (SFE) allows a set of players to compute an arbitrary agreed function of their private inputs, even if an adversary may corrupt some of the players. Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a generalization allowing to perform an arbitrary on-going (also called reactive or stateful) computation during which players can receive outputs and provide new inputs at intermediate stages. At Crypto 2006, Ishai et al. considered mixed threshold adversaries that either passively corrupt some fixed number of players, or, alternatively, actively corrupt some (smaller) fixed number of players, and showed that for certain thresholds, cryptographic SFE is possible, whereas cryptographic MPC is not. However, this separation does not occur when one considers perfect security. Actually, past work suggests that no such separation exists, as all known general protocols for perfectly secure SFE can also be used for MPC. Also, such a separation does not show up with general adversaries, characterized by a collection of corruptible subsets of the players, when considering passive and active corruption. In this paper, we study the most general corruption model where the adversary is characterized by a collection of adversary classes, each specifying the subset of players that can be actively, passively, or fail-corrupted, respectively, and show that in this model, perfectly secure MPC separates from perfectly secure SFE. Furthermore, we derive the exact conditions on the adversary structure for the existence of perfectly secure SFE resp. MPC, and provide efficient protocols for both cases.