Voice Loops as Coordination Aids in Space ShuttleMission Control
Computer Supported Cooperative Work
Communications of the ACM - Adaptive middleware
Shift Changes, Updates, and the On-Call Architecture in Space Shuttle Mission Control
Computer Supported Cooperative Work
Cognition, Technology and Work
Making Sense of Sensemaking 2: A Macrocognitive Model
IEEE Intelligent Systems
Joint Cognitive Systems
Cognition, Technology and Work
Cognition, Technology and Work
The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies
The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies
Flexecution as a Paradigm for Replanning, Part 1
IEEE Intelligent Systems
Brittleness in the design of cooperative problem-solving systems: the effects on user performance
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans
Examining the complexity behind a medication error: generic patterns in communication
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans
Layers in Sorting Practices: Sorting out Patients with Potential Cancer
Computer Supported Cooperative Work
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This paper contrasts cooperative work in two cases of distributed anomaly response, both from space shuttle mission control, to learn about the factors that make anomaly response robust. In one case (STS-76), flight controllers in mission control recognized an anomaly that began during the ascent phase of a space shuttle mission, analyzed the implications of the failure for mission plans, and made adjustments to plans (the flight ended safely). In this case, a Cooperative Advocacy approach facilitated a process in which diverse perspectives were orchestrated to provide broadening and cross-checks that reduced the risk of premature narrowing. In the second case (the Columbia space shuttle accident--STS-107), mission management treated a debris strike during launch as a side issue rather than a safety of flight concern and was unable to recognize the dangers of this event for the flight which ended in tragedy. In this case, broadening and cross-checks were missing due to fragmentation over the groups involved in the anomaly response process. The comparison of these cases points to critical requirements for designing collaboration over multiple groups in anomaly response situations.