Theory and Practice in AI and Law: A Response to Branting

Authors:
Katie Atkinson;Trevor Bench-Capon
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 7ZF, UK, {katie,tbc}@csc.liv.ac.uk;Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 7ZF, UK, {katie,tbc}@csc.liv.ac.uk
Venue:
Proceedings of the 2005 conference on Legal Knowledge and Information Systems: JURIX 2005: The Eighteenth Annual Conference
Year:
2005

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Abstract

In this paper we use our previous work which has examined the different levels involved in reasoning about legal cases to examine some challenges to the relevance of current theoretical work in AI and Law made by Branting. In our model we view the process of legal reasoning as being divided into three distinct but interconnected levels of reasoning. These levels involve a bottom layer concerning facts about the world, a top layer concerning legal consequences, and a layer connecting the two, with conclusions at lower levels acting as premises for higher levels. We use our model to explain Branting's observations and show the relation with other strands of work from the AI and Law community.