Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Tolls for Heterogeneous Selfish Users in Multicommodity Networks and Generalized Congestion Games
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A network pricing game for selfish traffic
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Competition and Efficiency in Congested Markets
Mathematics of Operations Research
Optimal marketing strategies over social networks
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
Competition in Parallel-Serial Networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Bertrand competition in networks
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
De-ossifying internet routing through intrinsic support for end-network and ISP selfishness
Proceedings of the ACM SIGMETRICS joint international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
De-ossifying internet routing through intrinsic support for end-network and ISP selfishness
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review - Performance evaluation review
Strategic pricing in next-hop routing with elastic demands
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Price competition in online combinatorial markets
Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on World wide web
Strategic Pricing in Next-Hop Routing with Elastic Demands
Theory of Computing Systems
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The Internet is composed of multiple economically-independent service providers that sell bandwidth in their networks so as to maximize their own revenue. Users, on the other hand, route their traffic selfishly to maximize their own utility. How does this selfishness impact the efficiency of operation of the network? To answer this question we consider a two-stage network pricing game where service providers first select prices to charge on their links, and users pick paths to route their traffic. We give tight bounds on the price of anarchy of the game with respect to social value--the total value obtained by all the traffic routed. Unlike recent work on network pricing, in our pricing game users do not face congestion costs; instead service providers must ensure that capacity constraints on their links are satisfied. Our model extends the classic Bertrand game in economics to network settings.