The competitiveness of on-line assignments
Journal of Algorithms
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Computing Nash equilibria for scheduling on restricted parallel links
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines
Theoretical Computer Science
Mechanism design for multi-agent meeting scheduling
Web Intelligence and Agent Systems
Simple search methods for finding a Nash equilibrium
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
Mixed-integer programming methods for finding Nash equilibria
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
A continuation method for Nash equilibria in structured games
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
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Game theory has gained popularity as an approach to analysing and understanding distributed systems with self-interested agents. Central to game theory is the concept of Nash equilibrium as a stable state (solution) of the system, which comes with a price − the loss in efficiency. The quantification of the efficiency loss is one of the main research concerns. In this paper, we study the quality and computational characteristics of the best Nash equilibrium in two selfish scheduling models: the congestion model and the sequencing model. In particular, we present the following results: (1) In the congestion model: first, the best Nash equilibrium is socially optimum and consequently, computing the best Nash is NP-hard; second, any ε-approximation algorithm for finding the optimum can be transformed into an ε-approximation algorithm for the best Nash. (2) In sequencing model: for identical machines, we show that the best Nash is no better than the worst Nash and it is easy to compute; for related machines, we show that there is a gap between the worst and the best Nash equilibrium, and leave the analytical bound of this gap for future work.