Queueing game models for differentiated services

Authors:
Parijat Dube;Rahul Jain
Affiliations:
IBM T.J. Watson Research, Hawthorne, NY;University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA
Venue:
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
Year:
2009

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Abstract

We develop a framework to study differentiated services when there are competing network providers. We adopt a multi-class queueing model, where providers post prices for various service classes. Traffic is elastic and users are Quality of Service (QoS)-sensitive, and choose a queue and a class with one of the providers. We model the relationship between capacity, QoS and prices offered by service providers in a competitive network services market. We establish sufficient conditions for existence of Nash equilibrium in the multi-class queueing game. We also explore characterization of inefficiency in the multi-class queueing game model. The modeling framework we provide can be used to study important properties of the equilibrium solution which may be exploited to provide useful guidelines for performance planning and pricing strategies for firms competing in network resource markets.