The Aumann-Shapley price mechanism for allocating congestion costs

Authors:
Moshe Haviv
Affiliations:
Department of Statistics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 91905 Jerusalem, Israel and Econometrics and Business Statistics, The University of Sydney, Sydney NSW 2006, Australia
Venue:
Operations Research Letters
Year:
2001

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Abstract

This paper shows how to apply the Aumann-Shapley price mechanism for charging customers for the congestion costs that they impose on others. The mechanism is demonstrated on a single server queue with Poisson arrivals under various queueing disciplines.