Summary cache: a scalable wide-area web cache sharing protocol
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Approximation algorithms for data placement in arbitrary networks
SODA '01 Proceedings of the twelfth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Replication Algorithms in a Remote Caching Architecture
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Chord: a scalable peer-to-peer lookup protocol for internet applications
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Selfish caching in distributed systems: a game-theoretic analysis
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Distributed Selfish Replication
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Algorithmic Game Theory
Designing networks with good equilibria
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Strategy-proof mechanisms for facility location games with many facilities
ADT'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Algorithmic decision theory
Cache me if you can: capacitated selfish replication games
LATIN'12 Proceedings of the 10th Latin American international conference on Theoretical Informatics
| Hi-index | 0.01 |
We study distributed content replication networks formed voluntarily by selfish autonomous users, seeking access to information objects that originate from distant servers. Each user caters to minimization of its individual access cost by replicating locally (up to constrained storage capacity) a subset of objects, and accessing the rest from the nearest possible location. We show existence of stable networks by proving existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria for a game-theoretic formulation of this situation. Social (overall) cost of stable networks is measured by the average or by the maximum access cost experienced by any user. We study socially most and least expensive stable networks by means of tight bounds on the ratios of the Price of Anarchy and Stability respectively. Although in the worst case the ratios may coincide, we identify cases where they differ significantly. We comment on simulations exhibiting occurence of cost-efficient stable networks on average.