Journal of Computer and System Sciences - 26th IEEE Conference on Foundations of Computer Science, October 21-23, 1985
On the complexity of the parity argument and other inefficient proofs of existence
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue: 31st IEEE conference on foundations of computer science, Oct. 22–24, 1990
An adaptive data replication algorithm
ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS)
STOC '97 Proceedings of the twenty-ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A digital fountain approach to reliable distribution of bulk data
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM '98 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communication
Placement algorithms for hierarchical cooperative caching
Journal of Algorithms
Coordinated Placement and Replacement for Large-Scale Distributed Caches
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
Replication Algorithms in a Remote Caching Architecture
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Design Considerations for Distributed Caching on the Internet
ICDCS '99 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Selfish caching in distributed systems: a game-theoretic analysis
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON) - Special issue on networking and information theory
Distributed Selfish Replication
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Algorithmic Game Theory
Settling the complexity of computing two-player Nash equilibria
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Approximation Algorithms for Data Placement Problems
SIAM Journal on Computing
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
On the social cost of distributed selfish content replication
NETWORKING'08 Proceedings of the 7th international IFIP-TC6 networking conference on AdHoc and sensor networks, wireless networks, next generation internet
Price of anarchy, locality gap, and a network service provider game
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Market sharing games applied to content distribution in ad hoc networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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Motivated by peer-to-peer (P2P) networks and content delivery applications, we study Capacitated Selfish Replication (CSR) games, which involve nodes on a network making strategic choices regarding the content to replicate in their caches. Selfish replication games were introduced in [6], who analyzed the uncapacitated case leaving the capacitated version as an open direction. In this work, we study pure Nash equilibria of CSR games with an emphasis on hierarchical networks, which have been extensively used to model communication costs of content delivery and P2P systems. The best result from previous work on CSR games for hierarchical networks [19,23] is the existence of a Nash equilibrium for a (slight generalization of a) 1-level hierarchy when the utility function is based on the sum of the costs of accessing the replicated objects in the network. Our main result is an exact polynomial-time algorithm for finding a Nash Equilibrium in any hierarchical network using a new technique which we term "fictional players".We show that this technique extends to a general framework of natural preference orders, orders that are entirely arbitrary except for two constraints - "Nearer is better" and "Independence of irrelevant alternatives". This axiomatic treatment captures a vast class of utility functions and even allows for nodes to simultaneously have utility functions of completely different functional forms. Using our axiomatic framework, we next study CSR games on arbitrary networks and delineate the boundary between intractability and effective computability in terms of the network structure, object preferences, and number of objects. In addition to hierarchical networks, we show the existence of equilibria for general undirected networks when either object preferences are binary or there are two objects. For general CSR games, however, we show that it is NP-hard to determine whether equilibria exist. We also show that the existence of equilibria in strongly connected networks with two objects and binary object preferences can be solved in polynomial time via a reduction to the well-studied evencycle problem.