Analyzing and modeling encryption overhead for sensor network nodes
WSNA '03 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM international conference on Wireless sensor networks and applications
Remote software-based attestation for wireless sensors
ESAS'05 Proceedings of the Second European conference on Security and Privacy in Ad-Hoc and Sensor Networks
Agilla: A mobile agent middleware for self-adaptive wireless sensor networks
ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems (TAAS)
On the difficulty of software-based attestation of embedded devices
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Authenticated data compression in delay tolerant wireless sensor networks
INSS'09 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Networked sensing systems
Software-based remote code attestation in wireless sensor network
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
Secure code update for embedded devices via proofs of secure erasure
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
Short paper: lightweight remote attestation using physical functions
Proceedings of the fourth ACM conference on Wireless network security
Science of Computer Programming
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For WSN(Wireless Sensor Network) to provide reliable service, authentication is one of the most important requirements. The authentication usually means the entity authentication, but owing to the data centric nature of sensor network, much more importance must be put on the authentication(or attestation) for code of sensor nodes. The naive approach to the attestation is for the verifier to compare the previously known memory contents of the target node with the actual memory contents in the target node, but it has a significant drawback. In this paper, we show what the drawback is and propose a countermeasure. The basic idea of our countermeasure is not to give the malicious code any memory space to reside by cleaning the target node's memory space where the malicious code can reside. This scheme can verify the whole memory space of the target node and provides extremely low probability of malicious code's concealment without depending on accurate timing information unlike SWATT[1]. We provide this verification method and show the performance estimation in various environments.