Short paper: lightweight remote attestation using physical functions

  • Authors:
  • Steffen Schulz;Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi;Christian Wachsmann

  • Affiliations:
  • TU Darmstadt (CASED) & Macquarie University (INSS), Darmstadt, Germany;TU Darmstadt (CASED) & Fraunhofer SIT, Darmstadt, Germany;TU Darmstadt (CASED), Darmstadt, Germany

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the fourth ACM conference on Wireless network security
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

Remote attestation is a mechanism to securely and verifiably obtain information about the state of a remote computing platform. However, resource-constrained embedded devices cannot afford trusted hardware components to attest the device, while plain software attestation is generally vulnerable to network and collusion attacks. In this paper, we present a lightweight remote attestation scheme that links software attestation to remotely identifiable hardware by means of Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs). In contrast to exiting software attestation schemes, our solution (1) resists collusion attacks, (2) allows the simultaneous authentication of remote platforms, (3) and enables the detection of hardware attacks due to the tamper-evidence of PUFs.