Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Using a High-Performance, Programmable Secure Coprocessor
FC '98 Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Financial Cryptography
Using client puzzles to protect TLS
SSYM'01 Proceedings of the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10
Establishing the genuinity of remote computer systems
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
Secure coprocessors in electronic commerce applications
WOEC'95 Proceedings of the 1st conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 1
Hardware-Assisted Circumvention of Self-Hashing Software Tamper Resistance
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Pioneer: verifying code integrity and enforcing untampered code execution on legacy systems
Proceedings of the twentieth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Software integrity protection using timed executable agents
ASIACCS '06 Proceedings of the 2006 ACM Symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Proceedings of the 9th workshop on Multimedia & security
On the difficulty of validating voting machine software with software
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Remote Attestation on Legacy Operating Systems With Trusted Platform Modules
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Remote attestation on legacy operating systems with trusted platform modules
Science of Computer Programming
SAConf: Semantic Attestation of Software Configurations
ATC '09 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Autonomic and Trusted Computing
On the difficulty of software-based attestation of embedded devices
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Detecting code alteration by creating a temporary memory bottleneck
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Conqueror: tamper-proof code execution on legacy systems
DIMVA'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Detection of intrusions and malware, and vulnerability assessment
Secure code update for embedded devices via proofs of secure erasure
ESORICS'10 Proceedings of the 15th European conference on Research in computer security
Kells: a protection framework for portable data
Proceedings of the 26th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
A software-based root-of-trust primitive on multicore platforms
Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
Short paper: lightweight remote attestation using physical functions
Proceedings of the fourth ACM conference on Wireless network security
Are hardware performance counters a cost effective way for integrity checking of programs
Proceedings of the sixth ACM workshop on Scalable trusted computing
VIPER: verifying the integrity of PERipherals' firmware
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Remote software-based attestation for wireless sensors
ESAS'05 Proceedings of the Second European conference on Security and Privacy in Ad-Hoc and Sensor Networks
TIVA: trusted integrity verification architecture
DRMTICS'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Digital Rights Management: technologies, Issues, Challenges and Systems
Run-time control flow authentication: an assessment on contemporary x86 platforms
Proceedings of the 28th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
A security framework for the analysis and design of software attestation
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
SobTrA: a software-based trust anchor for ARM cortex application processors
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Data and application security and privacy
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Kennell and Jamieson [KJ03] recently introduced the Genuinity system for authenticating trusted software on a remote machine without using trusted hardware. Genuinity relies on machine-specific computations, incorporating side effects that cannot be simulated quickly. The system is vulnerable to a novel attack, which we call a substitution attack. We implement a successful attack on Genuinity, and further argue this class of schemes are not only impractical but unlikely to succeed without trusted hardware.