What computers still can't do: a critique of artificial reason
What computers still can't do: a critique of artificial reason
CYC: a large-scale investment in knowledge infrastructure
Communications of the ACM
Grounding symbols through evolutionary language games
Simulating the evolution of language
Theory of Mind for a Humanoid Robot
Autonomous Robots
Learning words from sights and sounds: a computational model
Learning words from sights and sounds: a computational model
Who Needs Emotions: The Brain Meets the Robot (Series in Affective Science)
Who Needs Emotions: The Brain Meets the Robot (Series in Affective Science)
How the Body Shapes the Way We Think: A New View of Intelligence (Bradford Books)
How the Body Shapes the Way We Think: A New View of Intelligence (Bradford Books)
Semiotic schemas: A framework for grounding language in action and perception
Artificial Intelligence - Special volume on connecting language to the world
Grounded spoken language acquisition: experiments in word learning
IEEE Transactions on Multimedia
AI in the 21st century - with historical reflections
50 years of artificial intelligence
SOFSEM'12 Proceedings of the 38th international conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science
On the road to thinking machines: insights and ideas
CiE'12 Proceedings of the 8th Turing Centenary conference on Computability in Europe: how the world computes
A tour of machine learning: An AI perspective
AI Communications - ECAI 2012 Turing and Anniversary Track
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The problem of consciousness has been divided by philosophers into the problem of Access Consciousness and the problem of Phenomenal Consciousness or "raw feel". In this chapter it is suggested that Access Consciousness is something that we can logically envisage building into a robot because it is a cognitive capacity giving rise to behaviors or behavioral tendencies or potentials. A few examples are given of how this is being done in current research. On the other hand, Phenomenal Consciousness or "raw feel" is problematic, since we do not know what we really mean by "feel". It is suggested that three main properties are what characterize feel: the fact that feels are different from each other, that there is structure in these differences, and that feels have sensory presence. It is then shown how, by taking the sensorimotor approach[24],[27] it is possible to account for these properties in a natural way and furthermore to make counter-intuitive empirical predictions which have recently been confirmed. In conclusion it is claimed that when we take the sensorimotor approach to feel, building raw feel into a robot becomes a theoretical possibility, even if we are a long way from actually attaining it.