Management Science
Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency
Management Science
Bundling and Competition on the Internet
Marketing Science
Information Goods Pricing and Copyright Enforcement: Welfare Analysis
Information Systems Research
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
INFORMS Journal on Computing
Bundling Information Goods of Decreasing Value
Management Science
Journal of Management Information Systems
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Increasingly, we see that firms offer many items on information-intensive channels and the Internet. Especially with low-marginal-cost digital goods, bundling may be a beneficial strategy. Different bundles may help customers become more discriminating and maximize profits. However, the marketplace evidence provides mixed observation of bundling rigorously pursued. In this study, we provide a general framework to analyze when and how bundling may be beneficial. We compare and contrast the firm and customer characteristics on bundling strategy. We analyze when individual sales can be beneficial. We find that when costs do not increase relative to the bundle valuation, firms find it beneficial to limit the number of bundles offered in the market. A low (zero) marginal cost firm benefits from offering just one big bundle. Such a firm obtains a higher profit compared to a firm that offers many bundles. With high marginal costs, the number of bundles increases with increasing customer valuation and/or heterogeneity. When a firm offers all the bundles, prices and profit increase as customer heterogeneity and valuation increase. When the number of offered items is high, individual sale (unbundling) may be preferred over bundling and bundling becomes an inferior strategy. Interestingly, a firm may benefit from unbundling the items when customers have higher valuations.