Deceiving in GOLEM: how to strategically pilfer help
Trust and deception in virtual societies
Formal Analysis of Models for the Dynamics of Trust Based on Experiences
MAAMAW '99 Proceedings of the 9th European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World: MultiAgent System Engineering
Trust and Deception in Mediated Communication
HICSS '03 Proceedings of the 36th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS'03) - Track1 - Volume 1
Principles of Trust for MAS: Cognitive Anatomy, Social Importance, and Quantification
ICMAS '98 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Multi Agent Systems
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Modeling culture in trade: uncertainty avoidance
Proceedings of the 2008 Spring simulation multiconference
Individualism and Collectivism in Trade Agents
IEA/AIE '08 Proceedings of the 21st international conference on Industrial, Engineering and Other Applications of Applied Intelligent Systems: New Frontiers in Applied Artificial Intelligence
Modeling Power Distance in Trade
Multi-Agent-Based Simulation IX
An agent architecture for multi-attribute negotiation
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Modelling trade and trust across cultures
iTrust'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Trust Management
Hi-index | 0.00 |
According to transaction cost economics, contracts are always incomplete and offer opportunities to defect. Some level of trust is a sine qua non for trade. If the seller is better informed about product quality than the buyer, the buyer has to rely on information the seller provides or has to check the information by testing the product or tracing the supply chain processes, thus incurring extra transaction cost. An opportunistic seller who assumes the buyer to trust, may deliver a lower quality product than agreed upon. In human decisions to deceive and to show trust or distrust, issues like mutual expectations, shame, self-esteem, personality, and reputation are involved. These factors depend in part on traders' cultural background. This paper proposes an agent model of deceit and trust and describes a multi-agent simulation where trading agents are differentiated according to Hofstede's dimensions of national culture. Simulations of USA and Dutch trading situations are compared.