Replacement attacks on behavior based software birthmark

  • Authors:
  • Zhi Xin;Huiyu Chen;Xinche Wang;Peng Liu;Sencun Zhu;Bing Mao;Li Xie

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science and Technology, Nanjing University, Nanjing, China;Department of Computer Science and Technology, Nanjing University, Nanjing, China;Department of Computer Science and Technology, Nanjing University, Nanjing, China;The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA;The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA;Department of Computer Science and Technology, Nanjing University, Nanjing, China;Department of Computer Science and Technology, Nanjing University, Nanjing, China

  • Venue:
  • ISC'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Information security
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

Software birthmarks utilize certain specific program characteristics to validate the origin of software, so it can be applied to detect software piracy. One state-of-the-art technology on software birthmark adopts dynamic system call dependence graphs as the unique signature of a program, which cannot be cluttered by existing obfuscation techniques and is also immune to the no-ops system call insertion attack. In this paper, we analyze its weaknesses and construct replacement attacks with the help of semantics-equivalent system calls to unlock the high frequent dependency between the system calls in an original system call dependence graph. Our results show that the proposed replacement attacks can destroy the original birthmark successfully.