Fault analysis of DPA-Resistant algorithms

  • Authors:
  • Frederic Amiel;Christophe Clavier;Michael Tunstall

  • Affiliations:
  • Security Labs, Gemalto, La Ciotat, France;Security Labs, Gemalto, La Ciotat, France;Smart Card Centre, Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, UK

  • Venue:
  • FDTC'06 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

In this paper several attacks are presented that allow information to be derived on faults injected at the beginning of cryptographic algorithm implementations that use Boolean masking to defend against Differential Power Analysis (DPA). These attacks target the initialisation functions that are used to enable the algorithm to be protected, allowing a fault attack even in the presence of round redundancy. A description of the experiments leading to the development of these attacks is also given.