Side channel cryptanalysis on SEED

  • Authors:
  • HyungSo Yoo;ChangKyun Kim;JaeCheol Ha;SangJae Moon;IlHwan Park

  • Affiliations:
  • School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Kyungpook National Univ., Daegu, Korea;School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Kyungpook National Univ., Daegu, Korea;Division of Information Science, Korea Nazarene Univ., Cheonan, Choongnam, Korea;School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Kyungpook National Univ., Daegu, Korea;National Security Research Institute, Daejeon, Korea

  • Venue:
  • WISA'04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information Security Applications
  • Year:
  • 2004

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Abstract

The Korea standard block cipher, SEED, is a 128-bit symmetric block cipher with a more complex F function than DES. This paper shows that SEED is vulnerable to two types of side channel attacks, a fault analysis attack and a power analysis attack. The first one is a fault insertion analysis which induces permanent faults on the whole left register of 15-round. This attack allows one to obtain the secret key by using only two faulty cipher texts for encryption and decryption processing respectively. The second attack is a more realistic differential power analysis. This attack requires about 1000 power traces to find the full secret key. The above two attacks use a reverse property of the F function to obtain secret key, where the reverse property is derived from the our research.