CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
An Implementation of DES and AES, Secure against Some Attacks
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
CHES '02 Revised Papers from the 4th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
A Logic Level Design Methodology for a Secure DPA Resistant ASIC or FPGA Implementation
Proceedings of the conference on Design, automation and test in Europe - Volume 1
A fast pipelined multi-mode DES architecture operating in IP representation
Integration, the VLSI Journal
Robustness of circuits under delay-induced faults: test of AES with the PAFI tool
IOLTS '07 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE International On-Line Testing Symposium
CHES '08 Proceeding sof the 10th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Practical Setup Time Violation Attacks on AES
EDCC-7 '08 Proceedings of the 2008 Seventh European Dependable Computing Conference
Silicon-level Solutions to Counteract Passive and Active Attacks
FDTC '08 Proceedings of the 2008 5th Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
Theoretical and Practical Aspects of Mutual Information Based Side Channel Analysis
ACNS '09 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Mutual Information Analysis: How, When and Why?
CHES '09 Proceedings of the 11th International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
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Cryptographic cores are used to protect various devices but their physical implementation can be compromised by observing dynamic circuit emanations in order to derive information about the secrets it conceals. Protection against these attacks, also called side channel attacks are major concern of the cryptographic community. Masking and dual-rail precharge logic are promoted as its countermeasures but each has its own vulnerabilities. In this article, we propose a simple countermeasure which comprises unrolling rounds of a cryptographic algorithm such that multiple rounds are executed per clock cycle. This will require a stronger hypothesis on multiple bits due to deeper diffusion of the key. Results show that it resist against correlation power analysis on Hamming distance and Hamming weight model if the datapath is cleared after each operation. We also evaluated mutual information metric on the design and results show that unrolled DES is less vulnerable.