Nash equilibria in concurrent priced games

  • Authors:
  • Miroslav Klimoš;Kim G. Larsen;Filip Štefaňák;Jeppe Thaarup

  • Affiliations:
  • Faculty of Informatics, Masaryk University, Czech Republic;Department of Computer Science, Aalborg University, Denmark;Faculty of Informatics, Masaryk University, Czech Republic;Department of Computer Science, Aalborg University, Denmark

  • Venue:
  • LATA'12 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Language and Automata Theory and Applications
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

Concurrent game structures model multi-player games played on finite graphs where the players simultaneously choose their moves and collectively determine the next state of the game. We extend this model with prices on transitions for each player. We study pure Nash equilibria in this framework where each player's payoff is the accumulated price of all transitions until reaching their goal state. We provide a construction of a Büchi automaton accepting all Nash equilibria outcomes and show how this construction can be used to solve a variety of related problems, such as finding pareto-optimal equilibria. Furthermore, we prove the problem of deciding the existence of equilibria to be NP-complete.