Pricing policies for quantity discounts
Management Science
A cooperative game theory model of quantity discounts
Management Science
Channel coordination and quantity discounts
Management Science
Bargaining theory with applications
Bargaining theory with applications
Knowledge and Organization: A Social-Practice Perspective
Organization Science
Effects of Bargaining in Electronic Commerce
WECWIS '99 Proceedings of the International Workshop on Advance Issues of E-Commerce and Web-Based Information Systems
A Supplier's Optimal Quantity Discount Policy Under Asymmetric Information
Management Science
Group Buying on the Web: A Comparison of Price-Discovery Mechanisms
Management Science
Dynamic Conversion Behavior at E-Commerce Sites
Management Science
Bundling Information Goods of Decreasing Value
Management Science
Pricing strategies in B2C electronic commerce: analytical and empirical approaches
Decision Support Systems
Comparison of the group-buying auction and the fixed pricing mechanism
Decision Support Systems
Dynamic Pricing on the Internet: Importance and Implications for Consumer Behavior
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Journal of Management Information Systems
Selling or Advertising: Strategies for Providing Digital Media Online
Journal of Management Information Systems
Segmenting uncertain demand in group-buying auctions
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
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Group buying is one of the major pricing mechanisms in which retailers can offer low group rates due to a saving on transaction costs and its target consumers are those with lower sensitivity on waiting time. Under group buying, group size significantly affects the waiting cost to which consumers have different tolerances. In this paper, we develop a two-stage pricing game to evaluate the impact of the waiting cost, competition, and group-facilitating technology on the profitability and efficiency of community-based group buying. Our results point out that when a monopolistic retailer operates a mixed channel, the retailer will charge a relatively high group rates in the group-buying channel to force most consumers to choose individual buying unless the transaction cost in the individual-buying channel is sufficiently high. If two competing retailers adopt different pure channels, investment in group-facilitating technology may weaken the profit of the retailer adopting community-based group buying when the actual selling-cost saving resulted from community-based group buying is not significant.