What computers still can't do: a critique of artificial reason
What computers still can't do: a critique of artificial reason
E-privacy in 2nd generation E-commerce: privacy preferences versus actual behavior
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Privacy in electronic commerce and the economics of immediate gratification
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision Making
IEEE Security and Privacy
Privacy in e-commerce: stated preferences vs. actual behavior
Communications of the ACM - Transforming China
An Exploration of Type Indeterminacy in Strategic Decision-Making
QI '09 Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium on Quantum Interaction
Beyond Ontology in Information Systems
QI '09 Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium on Quantum Interaction
Structured Information Retrieval and Quantum Theory
QI '09 Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium on Quantum Interaction
A quantum interpretation of the view-update problem
ADC '10 Proceedings of the Twenty-First Australasian Conference on Database Technologies - Volume 104
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The paper at hand aims to provide a rational explanation of why people generously give away personal data while at the same time being highly concerned about their privacy. For many years, research has come up with attempts to untangle the privacy paradox. We provide a thorough literature review on privacy decisions in socio-economic scenarios and identify explanatory gaps. To explain paradoxical behavior in privacy decision making we illuminate (1) generous data disclosure and (2) high valuation of privacy as two non-commuting observations of incompatible preferences (types). Abstract risk awareness of privacy threats and concrete privacy decisions are not interchangeable, i.e. disclosing personal data prior to becoming aware of privacy risks does not equal the raising of risk awareness before revealing personal information. Privacy decisions do not commute as subjects may alter their preferences indeterminately, i.e. at the time an actual decision is made, in response to discomfort arising from conflicting preferences.