Integrated circuit security: new threats and solutions
Proceedings of the 5th Annual Workshop on Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research: Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Challenges and Strategies
Dynamic evaluation of hardware trust
HST '09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
MOLES: malicious off-chip leakage enabled by side-channels
Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
A Survey of Hardware Trojan Taxonomy and Detection
IEEE Design & Test
Preventing IC Piracy Using Reconfigurable Logic Barriers
IEEE Design & Test
Overcoming an Untrusted Computing Base: Detecting and Removing Malicious Hardware Automatically
SP '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Detecting/preventing information leakage on the memory bus due to malicious hardware
Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation and Test in Europe
SP '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Defeating UCI: Building Stealthy and Malicious Hardware
SP '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Hard Disk Guard Based Policy Enforcement
POLICY '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks
Hardware trojan resistant computation using heterogeneous COTS processors
ACSC '13 Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Australasian Computer Science Conference - Volume 135
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Ensuring electronic components are free from Hardware Trojans is a very difficult task. Research suggests that even the best pre- and post-deployment detection mechanisms will not discover all malicious inclusions, nor prevent them from being activated. For economic reasons electronic components are used regardless of the possible presence of such Trojans. We developed the SAFER PATH architecture, which uses instruction and data fragmentation, program replication, and voting to create a computational system that is able to operate safely in the presence of active Hardware Trojans. We protect the integrity of the computation, the confidentiality of data being processed and ensure system availability. By combining a small Trusted Computing Base with Commercial-Off-The-Shelf processing elements, we are able to protect computation from the effects of arbitrary Hardware Trojans.