An experimental evaluation of the assumption of independence in multiversion programming
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Intelligent information dissemination services in hybrid satellite-wireless networks
Mobile Networks and Applications
Modeling software design diversity: a review
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Survivability: Protecting Your Critical Systems
IEEE Internet Computing
Building Diverse Computer Systems
HOTOS '97 Proceedings of the 6th Workshop on Hot Topics in Operating Systems (HotOS-VI)
A Design Diversity Metric and Reliability Analysis for Redundant Systems
ITC '99 Proceedings of the 1999 IEEE International Test Conference
On achieving software diversity for improved network security using distributed coloring algorithms
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Traust: a trust negotiation-based authorization service for open systems
Proceedings of the eleventh ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies
Diversify sensor nodes to improve resilience against node compromise
Proceedings of the fourth ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
The Traust Authorization Service
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Improving sensor network immunity under worm attacks: a software diversity approach
Proceedings of the 9th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Virtually eliminating router bugs
Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Emerging networking experiments and technologies
Using allopoietic agents in replicated software to respond to errors, faults, and attacks
Proceedings of the 48th Annual Southeast Regional Conference
Research on survivability metrics based on survivable process of network system
Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security of information and networks
Improving robustness of DNS to software vulnerabilities
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Software diversity: security, entropy and game theory
HotSec'12 Proceedings of the 7th USENIX conference on Hot Topics in Security
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We believe that a network, to be survivable, must be heterogeneous. Just like a species that draws on a small gene pool can succumb to a single environmental threat, so a homogeneous network is vulnerable to a malicious attack that exploits a single weakness common to all of its components. In contrast, in a network in which each critical functionality is provided by a diverse set of protocols and implementations, attacks that focus on a weakness of one such protocol or implementation will not be able to bring down the entire network, even though all elements are not be bulletproof and even if some of components are compromised.Following this survivability through heterogeneity philosophy, we propose a new survivability paradigm, called heterogeneous networking, for improving a network's defense capabilities. Rather than following the current trend of converging towards single solutions to provide the desired functionality at every element of the network architecture, this methodology calls for systematically increasing the network's heterogeneity without sacrificing its interoperability.