Communication design for electronic negotiations on the basis of XML schema
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on World Wide Web
Design of Roles and Protocols for Electronic Negotiations
Electronic Commerce Research
Data & Knowledge Engineering - Special issue: The language/action perspective
Developing e-Negotiation support with a meta-modeling approach in a web services environment
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: Web services and process management
A reputation system for electronic negotiations
Computer Standards & Interfaces
Learning as Meaning Negotiation: A Model Based on English Auction
KES-AMSTA '09 Proceedings of the Third KES International Symposium on Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications
Constraint-based winner determination for auction-based scheduling
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans
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Economic mechanisms are used to determine the flow of resources in a supply chain and to achieve an efficient allocation of goods and services in networked economies. In order to choose the "right" allocation mechanism for a certain situation it is important to know about the characteristics of different negotiation situations and the set of available mechanisms suitable in these situations. Over the past few years there has been an enormous interest of researchers in economics, computer science and game theory to develop advanced economic mechanisms for the creation of new types of electronic exchanges. Combinatorial auctions, multi-attribute auctions and multi-stage auctions are some of the approaches to extend the framework of mechanism design theory. In this paper we develop a classification scheme for negotiation situations in electronic commerce based on microeconomic theory. We describe classic mechanism design and auction theory, and classify old and new approaches in this field.