The Antecedents and Performance Implications of Cooperative Exchange Norms
Organization Science
The Antecedents and Performance Implications of Cooperative Exchange Norms
Organization Science
Achieving it consultant objectives through client project success
Information and Management
A Transaction Cost Perspective of the "Software as a Service" Business Model
Journal of Management Information Systems
Contracting Efficiency and New Firm Survival in Markets Enabled by Information Technology
Information Systems Research
Multitask Agency, Modular Architecture, and Task Disaggregation in SaaS
Journal of Management Information Systems
Safe Contexts for Interorganizational Collaborations Among Homeland Security Professionals
Journal of Management Information Systems
Client-Vendor Relationships in Offshore Applications Development: An Evolutionary Framework
Information Resources Management Journal
The Journal of Strategic Information Systems
Cost escalation in information technology outsourcing: A moderated mediation study
Decision Support Systems
Interorganizational information systems visibility and supply chain performance
International Journal of Information Management: The Journal for Information Professionals
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Opportunism is a central construct in exchange theory. Economists contend that despite the firm's best efforts to erect governance structures that reduce opportunism and preserve outcomes, there is always some opportunism that remains once the transaction is in place. Despite this, there are few studies that systematically investigate thesafeguarding efficacy of relationship attributes in the presence of such ex post opportunism. In this research, we develop a theoretical framework and provide a longitudinal test of the ability of various relationship safeguards to preserve performance outcomes and future expectations given varying levels of ex post opportunism in the relationship. Our survey results from over 300 buyers and suppliers indicates that given lower levels of opportunism, bilateral idiosyncratic investments and interpersonal trust enhance performance outcomes and future expectations, while goal congruence has no discernable effect. However, at higher levels of opportunism, goal congruence becomes a more powerful safeguard, while interpersonal trust becomes less effective. Bilateral idiosyncratic investments continue to preserve performance outcomes and future expectations even at higher levels of opportunism. Implications for the long-term management of interorganizational alliances are discussed.