Towards behavioral control in multi-player network games
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
Game theory as a tool for modeling cross-layer interactions
ICC'09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE international conference on Communications
Game theoretical approaches for transport-aware channel selection in cognitive radio networks
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
How many parallel TCP sessions to open: a pricing perspective
ICQT'06 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Internet Charging and QoS Technologies: performability has its Price
A cooperative differential game model based on transmission rate in wireless networks
Operations Research Letters
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We present a game-theoretic study of the selfish behavior of TCP users when they are allowed to use multiple concurrent TCP connections so as to maximize their goodputs or other utility functions. We refer to this as the TCP connection game. A central question we ask is whether there is a Nash Equilibrium in such a game, and if it exists, whether the network operates efficiently at such a Nash Equilibrium. Combined with the well known PFTK TCP Model [12], we study this question for three utility functions that differ in how they capture user behavior. The bad news is that the loss of efficiency or price of anarchy can be arbitrarily large if users have no resource limitations and are not socially responsible. The good news is that, if either of these two factors is considered, efficiency loss is bounded. This may partly explain why there will be no congestion collapse if many users use multiple connections.