Internet resiliency to attacks and failures under BGP policy routing

  • Authors:
  • Danny Dolev;Sugih Jamin;Osnat Mokryn;Yuval Shavitt

  • Affiliations:
  • School of Engineering and Computer Science, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel;Department of EECS, University of Michigan, Michigan;School of Electrical Engineering, Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, Israel;School of Electrical Engineering, Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, Israel

  • Venue:
  • Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
  • Year:
  • 2006

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00



We investigate the resiliency of the Internet at the Autonomous System (AS) level to failures and attacks, under the real constraint of business agreements between the ASs. The agreements impose policies that govern routing in the AS level, and thus the resulting topology graph is directed, and thus the teachability between Ases is not transitive. We show, using partial views obtained from the Internet, that the Internet's resiliency to a deliberate attack is much smaller than previously found, and its teachability is also somewhat lower under random failures. We use different metrics to measure resiliency, and also investigate the effect of added backup connectivity on the resiliency.