Mechanized proofs for the parameter abstraction and guard strengthening principle in parameterized verification of cache coherence protocols

Authors:
Yongjian Li
Affiliations:
Laboratory of Computer Science, Institute of Software, CAS, Beijing, China
Venue:
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM symposium on Applied computing
Year:
2007

Citing 1
Cited 4

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State space reduction in modeling checking parameterized cache coherence protocol by two-dimensional abstraction

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Abstract

Chou, Mannava, and Park proposed a novel method for verification of safety properties of cache protocols, which is underpinned by the principle of parameter abstraction and guard strengthening. However, no one has formally proved the correctness of this method itself. In this work, we want to fill the gap in the literature. We believe that our work provides an alternative to formally justify this method. The key points of our theory are symmetry and the introduction of an intermediate guard strengthening protocol. We mechanize our theory in Isabelle/HOL.