Heuristic Algorithms for Task Assignment in Distributed Systems
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Foundations of genetic algorithms
Foundations of genetic algorithms
SAC '92 Proceedings of the 1992 ACM/SIGAPP symposium on Applied computing: technological challenges of the 1990's
On the existence of equilibria in noncooperative optimal flow control
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Comparison of global search methods for design optimization using simulation
WSC '91 Proceedings of the 23rd conference on Winter simulation
Distributed rational decision making
Multiagent systems
A game theoretic framework for bandwidth allocation and pricing in broadband networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Handbook of Computational Economics
Handbook of Computational Economics
Oblivious AQM and nash equilibria
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
FOCS '02 Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Efficient and robust query processing in dynamic environments using random walk techniques
Proceedings of the 3rd international symposium on Information processing in sensor networks
IEEE Transactions on Computers
A game theoretic approach for power optimization during behavioral synthesis
IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
Game theory models for IEEE 802.11 DCF in wireless ad hoc networks
IEEE Communications Magazine
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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The optimal allocation of resources to emergency locations in the event of multiple crises in an urban environment is an intricate problem, especially when the available resources are limited. In such a scenario, it is important to allocate emergency response units in a fair manner based on the criticality of the crisis events and their requests. In this research, a crisis management tool is developed which incorporates a resource allocation algorithm. The problem is formulated as a game-theoretic framework in which the crisis events are modeled as the players, the emergency response centers as the resource locations with emergency units to be scheduled, and the possible allocations as strategies. The payoff is modeled as a function of the criticality of the event and the anticipated response times. The game is played assuming a specific region within a certain locality of the crisis events to derive an optimal allocation. If a solution is not feasible, the perimeter of the locality in consideration is increased and the game is repeated until convergence. Experimental results are presented to illustrate the efficacy of the proposed methodology and metrics are derived to quantify the fairness of the solution. A regression analysis is performed to establish the statistical significance of the results.